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RECENT DECISIONS
would not be a relevant consideration, and the Court couic objectively
view the transaction to determine if legal ties exist between the two
sales. Any other interpretation would be tenuous and could not, in
light of the plain language of the statute prohibiting a sale within six
months of purchase, be justified upon the mere grounds of literal inter-
pretation.
A further query raised by Reliance is whether a change in applicable
SEC reporting requirements will affect the result of the instant case.
Though the Court devoted some time to the inconsistencies in certain
SEC rules and releases, it does not appear that the discussion was
particularly material to the holding.39 Thus an immediate promulgation
of amended reporting requirements by the SEC should not limit to any
extent the instant holding.
In Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co., form has prevailed
over substance and a 10% beneficial owner is now liberated from certain
16(b) constraints. As such, he may waltz merrily away from section
16(b) liability to the tune of a rhythmic "two step."
VENDOR AND VENDEE-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-CALIFORNIA POLICY
AGAINST FORFEITURES PRECLUDES DENYING THE RIGHT TO SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE TO A WILLFULLY DEFAULTING VENDEE WHERE THE
LAND SALE CONTRACT HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY PERFORMED AND
No DETRIMENT WILL BEFALL THE VENDOR BY THE VENDEE'S CON-
TINUED PERFORMANCE OF THE CONTRACT-MacFadden v. Walker,
5 Cal. 3d 809, 488 P.2d 1353, 97 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1971).
In April 1953, Mrs. Claudia Walker (vendee) entered into an in-
stallment real estate contract with Ellsworth MacFadden (vendor) to
purchase eighty acres of unimproved land. The contract provided for
an initial payment to be made, followed by monthly installments. It
also provided that time was of the essence and that upon any default
by the vendee in her monthly payments the vendor could terminate
all of the vendee's rights under the contract and retain all executed
payments as the reasonable rental value of the land. The vendee oc-
cupied the land, made improvements, and paid the installments as
they became due. In late 1963 the vendee, upon discovering that
39. See note 12 supra.
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timber had been cut and removed from the land, discontinued paying
the monthly installments. The vendee alleged that the vendor was re-
sponsible for the removal and claimed that she was entitled to a credit
for the proceeds purportedly received by him. Nevertheless, after the
filing of a quiet title action by the vendor the vendee paid into court
an amount sufficient to satisfy the remainder due on the contract plus
interest, and cross-complained seeking specific performance. Finding
the contract fair, the consideration adequate, and the vendee in good
faith and in substantial performance of the contract, the trial court held
that the vendee's breach was not grossly negligent, willful or fraudulent
and granted her specific performance under California Civil Code
section 3275.1 The California Supreme Court, applying a different ra-
tionale, affirmed.2 The court found that since there was insufficient
evidence to sustain the finding that the breach was not willful, re-
lief was not available under section 3275. 3 Reaffirming its holding in
Freedman v. The Rector4 that section 3275 was not the exclusive source
of the right to relief from forfeiture, the court held that the anti-for-
feiture policy established in Freedman justified the award of specific
performance to a willfully defaulting vendee in certain circumstances.5
The MacFadden court noted that the contract had been substantially
performed prior to the breach, and that the vendor, if specific per-
formance were granted, would receive nothing less than the benefits he
bargained for. Under these circumstances, the court affirmed the de-
cree for specific performance.
1. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3275 (West 1970):
Whenever, by the terms of an obligation a party thereto incurs a forfeiture,
or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture by reason of his failure to comply with its
provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full compensation to the
other party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful, or fraudulent breach of
duty.
2. MacFadden v. Walker, 5 Cal. 3d 809, 811, 488 P.2d 1353, 1353-54, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 537, 537-38 (1971).
3. Id. at 813, 488 P.2d at 1355, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 539. In order to qualify for
relief under section 3275 the vendee has the burden of pleading and proving facts that
will justify its application. Barkis v. Scott, 34 Cal. 2d 116, 120, 208 P.2d 367, 370
(1949).
4. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
5. 5 Cal. 3d at 813-14, 488 P.2d at 1355-56, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40. Civil Code
section 3294 limits punitive damages to actions for the breach of obligations not
arising from contract. Sections 1670 and 1671 preclude the setting of liquidated
damages for possible future breach of a contract unless it would be impracticable or
extremely difficult to fix the actual damage. Section 3369(1) prohibits the granting of
specific or preventive relief to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in any case. These
code sections have been construed to formulate a policy against forfeiture where the
forfeiture bears no reasonable relationship to the damage suffered by the vendor.
Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 21-22, 230 P.2d 629, 632-33 (1951).
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In 1957 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Ward v.
Union Bond & Trust Co.,' reaffirmed a district court decision which
granted a willfully defaulting purchaser specific performance under a
land sale contract. This decision subsequently led various commenta-
tors to conjecture whether the state courts would accept Ward's inter-
pretation of California law.7 MacFaddcn now puts an end to such
conjecture and marks the culmination of a long history of "judicial
legislation" on the subject of the defaulting purchaser's remedies un-
der a land sale contract.
Originally the rule in California was that forfeitures would be en-
forced in land sale contracts where time was of the essence." Recog-
nizing the harshness of this rule, the courts adopted various rationales
to circumvent its application. 9 However, it was not until the Supreme
Court's decision in Barkis v. Scott10 that this rule was finally aban-
doned. There, section 327511 was found to be a valid basis upon
which to enable a purchaser, who in good faith breached a land sale
contract providing that time was of the essence, to be relieved of a for-
feiture and to have his contract rights restored.12
In Baffa v. Johnson,'3 the California Supreme Court affirmatively es-
6. 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957).
7. Several authors had anticipated a determination by California courts of the
merits of granting a willfully defaulting vendee the remedies of specific performance or
reinstatement of the contract. E.g., Smith, Contractual Controls of Damages in Com-
mercial Transactions, 12 HAST. L.J. 122, 134-37 (1960-61); Comment, 10 STAN. L.
REV. 355, 360-61 (1957-58); Comment, 2. U.S.F. L. REv. 329, 335-36 (1967-68).
8. Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co., 123 Cal. 1, 55 P. 713 (1898).
9. E.g., Ebbert v. Mercantile Trust Co., 213 Cal. 496, 2 P.2d 776 (1931) (granting
relief from forfeiture on the grounds that the breach was of a condition subsequent
and not of a condition precedent as in the Glock decision); Collins v. Eksoozian,
61 Cal. App. 184, 214 P. 670 (1923) (denying forfeiture on the grounds of estoppel,
but justifying Glock's refusal to apply section 3275 on the basis of section 1492 which
purportedly precludes relief under 3275 where the contract provides that time is of the
essence; accord, Henck v. Lake Hemet Water Co., 9 Cal. 2d 136, 143, 69 P.2d 849,
852 (1937); Grattian v. Coleman, 86 Cal. App. 2d 266, 268, 194 P.2d 728, 729
(1948) ); Gonzalez v. Hirose, 33 Cal. 2d 213, 200 P.2d 793 (1948) (forfeiture denied
on the grounds of waiver or estoppel); Flanery v. Mudd, 86 Cal. App. 2d 250,
194 P.2d 806 (1948) (same); Fickbohm v. Knaust, 103 Cal. App. 443, 284 P. 692
(1930) (same); McDonald v. Kingsbury, 16 Cal. App. 244, 116 P. 380 (1911)
(same).
10. 34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
11. Note 1 supra.
12. 34 Cal. 2d at 12-24, 208 P.2d at 371-72. The Barkis court noted that section
3275 was not discussed in Glock as a possible means of relief from forfeiture.
While the court refused to overrule Glock because of this and other distinctions, the
validity of the Glock decision must be seriously questioned in light of the current
court's strong stance against forfeitures.
13. 35 Cal. 2d 36, 216 P.2d 13 (1950).
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tablished that where section 3275 is inapplicable because of a purchas-
er's willful default, section 3369(1)' 4 will deny a forfeiture to a vendor
if the purchaser can prove that the vendor has received more than
the benefit of his bargain and has refused to return the excess to the
purchaser.' 5 Thereafter, in Freedman v. The Rector,' the court es-
poused the principle that section 3275 was not the exclusive source
of relief from forfeiture and held that, under the anti-forfeiture policy
of the law, the willfully defaulting vendee was entitled to restitution in
the amount that his previous payments exceeded the damages caused
to the vendor as a result of the breach.'
7
The court's decisions in Barkis, Baffa, and Freedman substantially
contributed to the elimination of the vendor's preferred position un-
der the land sale contract.' 8 Nevertheless, no court had yet considered
whether the purchaser who willfully defaulted on his land sale con-
tract could require specific performance or reinstatement of the con-
tract. In Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co.,19 however, the ninth cir-
cuit court, relying primarily on Freedman, affirmed the lower court
holding that a willfully defaulting purchaser was entitled to a decree of
specific performance. 20  The circuit court prefaced its decision by stat-
ing that the ultimate aim in equity is to save the parties from harm
and. to do what is just and equitable to permit them as vendor and
purchaser to have the benefit of their respective bargains. 2 ' Though
the decision seemed the logical progression of California law following
the Barkis, Baffa, and Freedman decisions, the result was not unani-
mously accepted.2 Nevertheless, the MacFadden court followed the
Ward precedent when it relied upon the anti-forfeiture policy recog-
nized in Freedman to hold that the willfully defaulting vendee was en-
titled to specific performance of the land sale contract.2" This judicial
14. CAL . Crv. CoDE § 3369(1) (West 1970), which provides in part that "[n]ei-
ther specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce a penalty or forfeiture in
any case. .... "
15. 35 Cal. 2d at 39, 216 P.2d at 14.
16. 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
17. Id.
18. See Hetland, Real Property and Real Property Security: The Well-Being of the
Law, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 151, 152-59 (1965); Smith, Contractual Controls of Damages
in Commercial Transactions, 12 HAST. L.J. 122, 134-36 (1960-61); Comment, 10
STAN. L. R v. 355 (1957-58); Comment, 2 U.S.F. L. REv. 329 (1966-68); Note, 40
CALIF. L. REv. 593 (1952).
19. 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957).
20. Id. at 478-81.
21. Id. at 480.
22. E.g., Comment, 10 STAN. L. REv. 355, 359-61 (1957-58).
23. 5 Cal. 3d at 814, 488 P.2d at 1356, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 540. In reaching this deci-
sion the court distinguished Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 801,
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clarification of the remedies available to the willfully defaulting vendee
had been anticipated by most commentators.24
The MacFadden decision arguably affords vendees a broader ambit
of protection than did the previous specific performance decisions, and
should not be limited in application to its specific fact situation. Lan-
guage in Barkis would appear to limit the remedy of specific perform-
ance to only those situations where the land sale contract had been
substantially performed or where the vendee had made substantial
improvements on the property. 25 The Barkis court reasoned that per-
mitting the vendor to terminate the vendee's rights under the contract
and to keep the installments that have been made could only result in
the harshest sort of forfeiture where the vendee has substantially per-
formed or made substantial improvements in reliance on his contract.
26
While the vendee in MacFadden had similarly made substantial im-
provements on the property and had substantially performed the con-
tract, a close reading of that opinion indicates that such actions by
the vendee may not be prerequisites for the imposition of the equitable
relief.
In affording specific performance the MacFadden court under-
scored the anti-forfeiture policy established in Freedman. There, the
vendee willfully defaulted after making the down payment. He had
415 P.2d 833, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966). There, the vendee sought rescission of a land
sale contract on the basis of a material misrepresentation. The trial court, however,
found the vendee in default because there were no grounds for the rescission, and
entered judgment quieting title in the vendor on condition that he pay the vendee the
difference between the amount paid by the vendee under the contract and the rental
value of the property while in his possession. Id. at 802-03, 415 P.2d at 834,
52 Cal. Rptr. at 19. The California Supreme Court reversed the trial court on
the measure of damages, stating that the proper measure was the benefit of the bar-
gain to the vendor. The vendor was permitted to quiet title on condition that he
refund the excess of the payments received, if any, over the amount necessary to give
him the benefit of his bargain. Id. at 805, 415 P.2d at 836, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
The vendor in MacFadden contended that this holding established that restitution of the
excess of the part payments over the damages caused by the breach was the ex-
clusive remedy available to the willfully defaulting vendee. This contention was prop-
erly refuted on the grounds that the Honey decision was limited to a discussion of the
alternative measures of restitution and not the alternative remedies available to a
defaulting vendee where specific performance is sought. 5 Cal. 3d at 815, 488 P.2d
at 1356, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 540. See Comment, 2 U.S.F. L. Rlv. 329, 336 (1966-68),
as support for this distinction.
24. E.g., Smith, Contractual Controls of Damages in Commercial Transactions,
12 HAST. L.J 122, 134-36 (1960-61); Comment, 2 U.S.F. L. REv. 329 (1966-68).
25. 34 Cal. 2d at 122, 208 P.2d at 371. Accord, Scarbery v. Bill Patch Land & Wa-
ter Co., 184 Cal. App. 2d 87, 104, 7 Cal. Rptr. 408, 418 (1960); Lucientes v.
Bliss, 157 Cal. App. 2d 565, 572, 321 P.2d 526, 531 (1958).
26. 34 Cal. 2d at 122, 208 P.2d at 371.
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neither substantially performed the contract nor made improvements on
the property.17  Yet, the MacFadden court inferred that specific per-
formance would have been an available remedy in Freedman if the
vendor had not sold the property to a bona fide purchaser prior to
the vendee's suit.28  Thus, notwithstanding the willfully defaulting
vendee's culpability, where the damage caused by the breach has no
reasonable relationship to the remedy of forfeiture, specific perform-
ance should remain a viable remedy. If the damage to the vendor is
slight and he is assured of receiving the benefit of his bargain by spe-
cific performance, there is then no equitable reason, barring some equit-
able defense such as laches or unclean hands,29 not to allow such re-
lief.30 Specific performance is therefore an arguable alternative to the
willfully defaulting vendee's remedy of restitution even where the con-
tract has not been substantially performed nor improvements made on
the property.
MacFadden also raises the possibility of affording additional relief
to a willfully defaulting vendee based on the concept espoused by Pro-
fessor John Hetland that the land sale contract should be treated simi-
larly to any other security device involving land.,, So viewed, the
vendee should have the right to reinstate the contract whether his de-
fault was willful or non-willful.32 Although the MacFadden court de-
dined to consider this possibility, it approvingly cited Hetland's opin-
ion on the subject, thereby inferring that in a proper case this view
will be adopted to provide an additional remedy to a willfully de-
faulting vendee.33  The court has evidenced a concern with maintain-
27. Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 18, 230 P.2d 629, 630 (1951).
28. 5 Cal. 3d at 814, 488 P.2d at 1355-56, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40.
29. It must be noted that the remedy of specific performance will only be awarded
where equity deems it appropriate and fair to the party against whom it is being in-
voked. Id. at 815, 488 P.2d at 1356-57, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 540-41.
30. Such relief would be in conformity with the statement by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Ward v. Union Bond & Trust Co., 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957),
that the primary aim of equity proceedings in the context of relief under a land sale
contract is to permit the vendor and vendee to each have the benefit of their re-
spective bargains. Id. at 480.
31. 3. HETLAND, CALIFoRNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS 105-06 (C.E.B.
1971).
32. Id.
33. 5 Cal. 3d at 816, 488 P.2d at 1357, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 541. See Newhouse v.
Upchurch, 22 Cal. App. 3d 204; 99 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1971), wherein the court of ap-
peals, in allowing reinstatement of a land-sale contract in favor of a defaulting pur-
chaser, took notice of the MacFadden court's apparent propensity to view a land sale
contract as any other security device: "In MacFadden v. Walker, . . . the Supreme
Court has recognized the applicability of principles governing security foreclosures to
installment land sales contracts." (citation omitted). Id. at 212, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
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